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I. INTRODUCTION
A quarter century after the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (ritle
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968),1 the American landscape remains marked
by racial segregation. 2 Housing remains perhaps the most segregated aspect of
American life.3 The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was intended to promote "open,
integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of
segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act
was designed to combat." 4 However, by some accounts, the black prospective
renter faces a 75% chance of becoming a victim of housing discrimination. 5
This statistic displays one symptom leading many to conclude that Congress'
goal in enacting the FHA, ending patterns of housing segregation, has largely
gone unrealized.6
The FHA prohibition of discriminatory advertising is abused often, but is
rarely enforced. Section 3604(c) of the FHA provides in pertinent part:
it shall be unlawful... [to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published, any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, ... or national origin, or an
intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 7
142 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1989) [hereinafter FHA].
2 James A. Kushner, 7he Fair Housing Anwndments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1049, 1061 (1989).3 Id. at 1051.
4 Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973); see also
Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 579 F. Supp. 1407, 1418 (N.D. ]M. 1984).
5 Kushner, supra note 2, at 1052. The chances of being a discrimination victim are
almost as great for the black prospective property buyer. Id.
6 See, e.g., id. at 1061; see also Michael R. Tein, Comment, The Devaluation of
Nonwhite Community in Remedies for Subsidized Housing Discimination, 140 U. PA. L.
REv. 1463, 1465 (1992).
7 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988).
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While one can envision more distasteful FHA violations, because advertising
plays such a critical role in the purchase and rental of housing,8 violations of
section 3604(c) are particularly harmful to the goal of integrated housing.9
A subtle form of section 3604(c) violation occurs when advertisers, in
promoting their property, utilize human models, all of whom are white.' 0
Recognizing that advertisers can and do indicate a racial preference by the
choice of models of a particular race, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development promulgated regulations to assist advertisers in their effort to
avoid violating section 3604(c) by their choice of models." When such subtle
indications of preference are challenged under section 3604(c), the standard by
which the court interprets the challenged advertisement is crucial to the
outcome of the case.
This Comment discusses the standard applied in section 3604(c) cases in
which the use of human models is challenged as discriminatory. Courts
applying section 3604(c) have reviewed advertisements using a standard
commonly called the "ordinary reader" standard. Part II of this Comment will
discuss the genesis and history of the ordinary reader standard. Part I will
consider the failure of courts to adequately define the attributes of the ordinary
reader. Part IV will establish that courts reviewing challenged advertisements
do so from the perspective of the "ordinary reader" rather than the perspective
8 Margaret A. Fiorino, Comment, Advertising for Apartheid: The Use of All White
Models in Marketing Real Estate as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 56 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1429, 1442 (1988).
9 South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868,
884 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992) (urging affirmative efforts to
integrate housing).
10 Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 81 (1991).
This discussion is limited to the expression of a racial preference through the choice of
human models. While other groups protected by the Fair Housing Act have not challenged
advertisements which do not include members of those groups, the concepts discussed here
would apply to actions by members of any of the groups protected by the FHA.
"According to the regulation,
[iluman models . . . may not be used to indicate exclusiveness because of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. If models are used
... the models should be clearly definable as reasonably representing majority and
minority groups .... Models, if used, should ... indicate... that the housing is
open to all without regard to race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or
national origin ....
24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b) (1992).
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of the ordinary black reader. Finally, Part V will argue that courts should
review challenged advertisements from the perspective of the ordinary black
reader.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORDINARY READER STANDARD
When determining whether a given advertisement violates section 3604(c),
courts have until recently applied one of two competing standards. The first
standard requires a plaintiff to prove, through extrinsic evidence, that the
advertiser intended to send an exclusionary message.12 The second standard
adopts the position that a plaintiff need not prove intent in order to establish a
Fair Housing Act claim;' 3 this standard, first adopted in United States v.
Hunter,14 requires only that the plaintiff show that "[t]o the ordinary reader the
natural interpretation of the advertisements published ... is that they indicate a
racial preference." 15 FHA plaintiffs, under the ordinary reader approach, must
establish that the challenged advertisement "suggests to an ordinary reader that
a particular race is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question." 16
12 The District Court for the District of Columbia applied the intent requirement in
Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 541, 546 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 899 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990), According to the court, "absent a showing
of intent to indicate a racial preference or of other extrinsic circumstances revelatory of a
racial preference, real estate advertisements do not violate the Fair Housing Act merely
because models of a particular race are not used in one ad or a series of ads." The district
court's requirement of discriminatory intent was subsequently reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d
24,29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990).
13 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977), cet. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). In Arlington Heights, the
Seventh Circuit, noting the difficulty in establishing FHA violations, ruled that a plaintiff
challenging allegedly discriminatory zoning practices need not establish discriminatory
intent in order to maintain an action under § 3604(a). Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
14 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
15 Id. at 215. It should be noted that the factual situation in Hunter made it much easier
to apply-thus, to justify-the ordinary reader standard than it is to apply the standard in the
typical all-white model case. In Hunter, the challenged advertisement listed for rent an
apartment, "[i]n a private white home." Id. at 209 n.1.
16 Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 81 (1991) (adopting the ordinary reader approach and applying it in a case challenging
the use of all-white human models).
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Use of the ordinary reader standard is based on judicial acceptance of the
argument made by many that Congress' remedial goals in enacting the FHA17
can only be effectively served by removing from plaintiffs the onerous
requirement of proof of discriminatory intent.' 8 Courts applying other
provisions of the Fair Housing Act have applied similar standards. 19 Noting
that courts have applied the ordinary reader standard, rather than requiring a
showing of intent to discriminate, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Enquirer, Inc.,20 recognized that "[c]ourts have given a broad reading to the
FHA in order to fulfill its remedial purpose." 21 Congress' remedial goal of
integrating housing is being effectuated by courts reviewing, from the point of
view of the ordinary reader, advertisements alleged to violate section 3604(c).
While at one time there was a split in authority as to which standard-proof of
intent or ordinary reader-applied in section 3604(c) cases, 22 courts now
The Ragin court also broadly construed the statutory term "preference." The court said
an advertisement suggests a racial preference if it, "would discourage an ordinary reader of
a particular race from answering it." l at 999-1000.
Plaintiffs in courts which use the ordinary reader standard may also maintain a cause of
action if they can prove discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made
Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991).17 See Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973); see also
Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 579 F. Supp. 1407, 141 (N.D. Ill. 1984), afid, 830 F.2d 1420
(7th Cir. 1987).
18 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Cause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107 (1976) (arguing that in discrimination cases the requirement of discriminatory intent
ought to be eschewed in favor of an effects test); see also Kushner, supra note 2, at 1073-
76 (praising the practice of requiring a less burdensome showing by FHA plaintiffs than is
required of constitutional claimants).
19 For example,
the test used to determine whether a statement constitutes racial steering in violation of
Section 3604(a) [which prohibits refusing to sell or rent on the basis of a status listed by
the statute] is not the effect of the racial statement on the hearer of the statement, but
rather the effect the statement would have if heard by a reasonable person under the
circumstances who is seeking housing.
Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1232, 1250 (N.D. Ohio
1983), aef'd in part and rev'd in part, 774 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1019 (1986).
20 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991).
21 Id. at 646 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)).
2 2 Margot S. Rubin, Advertising and T7te VIII: The Disaiminatory Use of Models in
Real Estate Advertisements, 98 YALE L.. 165, 170 (1988). Rubin pointed to the District of
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uniformly apply the ordinary reader standard. 23 This standard is also used in
cases in which the alleged section 3604(c) violation is the use of all-white
human models.24
Il. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ORDINARY READER STANDARD
Applying a standard that makes an advertisement actionable under section
3604(c) if the ordinary reader would construe the advertisement as indicating a
racial preference raises several issues. Courts construing the ordinary reader
standard in the section 3604(c) context have failed to adequately describe the
attributes of the ordinary reader. Section B of this Part will illustrate how
courts evaluating claims of discrimination through the discriminatory use of
models have applied the standard.
A. Failure to Describe the Attributes of the Ordinary Reader
Few courts applying the ordinary reader standard to determine whether an
advertisement violates section 3604(c) have discussed the composition of the
ordinary reader. Those courts which have described the ordinary reader have
done so in a cursory and superficial manner. Courts which must apply the
standard to challenged advertisements thus have little guidance as to the
characteristics of the ordinary reader and how the ordinary reader would react
to given advertisements.
Some courts applying the ordinary reader standard have attempted to
establish the attributes of the hypothetical ordinary reader. 25 Others have
avoided attempting to define the ordinary reader and have simply assumed that
Columbia District Court application of an intent requirement in Spann v. Colonial Village,
Inc., as evidence of a split in jurisdictions on the issue of which standard ought to apply.
Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 541, 546 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 899 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1019 (1990). The Spann application of the intent
requirement was rejected when the decision was reversed. Research found no courts
currently applying an intent requirement.
23 See Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 81 (1991). The Ragin court refers to the use of the ordinary reader standard as a
"general, and fairly obvious, propositiono ....
24 E.g., id. at 999-1000.
25 See, e.g., Ragin v. New York Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
aff'd, 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991).
15251993]
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there exists a common understanding as to the ordinary reader's attributes. 26
Courts which have defined the nature of the postulated ordinary reader have
done so only in general terms. Such generalized explanations of the ordinary
reader are minimally helpful to other courts which must apply the standard and
to advertisers who seek to avoid violating section 3604(c).
One court has defined the ordinary reader as "nothing more, but nothing
less, than the common law's 'reasonable man': that familiar creature by whose
standards human conduct has been judged for centuries." 27 Because regulation
of discriminatory housing advertising involves variables unlike those in cases in
which the common law's "reasonable man" is the standard of conduct, this
description provides little guidance. For example, because we practice
conforming our behavior to that of the reasonable man every day, we usually
have some idea what precautions the reasonable man would take in order to
avoid being negligent. By testing the limits of reason we develop an internal
sense for how the hypothetical reasonable man would behave in given
circumstances. On the other hand, we rarely have to consider how the ordinary
reader would construe an advertisement-despite the fact that courts use the
ordinary reader standard in construing a variety of documents.2 8 We are
therefore likely to have significantly more difficulty in conforming to that
standard.
26 See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc.,
943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991).
2 7 Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 964 (rejecting defendant's contention that the ordinary
reader standard is unconstitutionally vague).
2 8 In defamation cases, the jury is instructed to consider the alleged defamatory
utterance from the perspective of the ordinary reader (or listener) to determine whether the
challenged statement is one of fact or opinion. E.g., Yetman v. English, 811 P.2d 323
(Ariz. 1991). The ordinary reader standard is also used to determine whether the challenged
statement is defamatory, i.e. whether it would damage the reputation of its subject in the
eyes of the reasonable reader (or listener). E.g., Johnson v. Houston Post Co., 807 S.W.2d
613, 614 (rex. Ct. App. 1991).
Courts view disputed terms in insurance contracts as would the ordinary reader. E.g.,
Western Am. Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring E., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991),
review granted, 413 S.E.2d 555 (N.C.), review dismissed, 420 S.E.2d 826 (N.C. 1992).
When reviewing state statutes and city ordinances to determine whether they are
unconstitutionally vague, courts view the challenged provision from the viewpoint of the
ordinary reader. E.g., Area Interstate Trucking, Inc. v. Indiana State Dep't of Revenue,
574 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d
816, 817 (Utah 1991).
In each of these contexts, courts have, as in the § 3604(c) context, viewed the




Another court has provided a description of the ordinary reader which is of
equally little value. According to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, "[tlhe ordinary reader is neither the most suspicious nor the
most insensitive of our citizenry." 29 One could assume from the name
"ordinary reader" that the hypothetical ordinary reader is neither extremely
insensitive nor extremely sensitive. Thus, this description does little in the way
of expanding on the ordinary reader label.
A comprehensive description of the characteristics of the ordinary reader-
such as age, race, educational background, gender, experiences, and
perspective-would assist courts applying the ordinary reader standard and
advertisers attempting to comply with section 3604(c).
B. Refining the Ordinary Reader Standard Cases Challenging
Advertisements Featuring All-White Hwnan Models
Since no comprehensive description of the ordinary reader has been
attempted, application of the standard in section 3604(c) cases is problematic. 30
The difficulty in applying the standard is aggravated in cases in which the
allegedly discriminatory message is subtle. 31  When the challenged
advertisement is blatantly discriminatory, a larger group of readers will view
the advertisement as sending a discriminatory message and the way in which
the ordinary reader standard is applied is not likely to be a central issue in the
dispute.32 However, advertisements need not suggest dispreference in order to
violate section 3604(c). Advertisements may violate section 3604(c) by
suggesting a preference,33 and advertisements can suggest preferences subtly.34
29 Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 81 (1991).
30 See Soules v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d
Cir. 1992) (applying the ordinary reader (listener) standard to statements by real estate
company representative to prospective customers).3 1 Id. at 825.
32 In urging the court to adopt a narrow view of what the ordinary reader would
construe as expressing a racial preference, one defendant suggested that only blatantly racist
symbols, such as a burning cross or a swastika, would send a discriminatory message to the
ordinary reader. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999.
33 Not every manifestation of a preference, however, indicates an actionable
communication of dispreference. In Almonte v. Pierce, -ispanic plaintiffs challenged a
marketing plan which failed to advertise in Hispanic media. In fact, the plan was designed
to attract prospective black and Asian clients who were under-represented in the publicly-
funded housing project. The court rejected the contention that the intent to attract Blacks
19931 1527
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The fact that statements are not facially discriminatory does not end the inquiry
into whether the statements, considered in their context, indicate an
impermissible preference.35
Perhaps the most subtle way in which an advertisement can suggest a racial
preference, and, thus, arguably a dispreference, is through its exclusive use of
human models of a particular race.36 It is in the context of the use of all-white
human models that application of the ordinary reader standard is especially
difficult.37 The issue in cases challenging advertisements which use only white
human models is whether the ordinary reader would, under the circumstances,
understand the advertisement as indicating a preference for individuals of the
races depicted. 38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced precisely
this issue in Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer,
Inc.39 In Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc., the plaintiff, a group
dedicated to the goal of fair housing, sued the Cincinnati Enquirer newspaper
under section 3604(c) for publishing housing advertisements over a period of
twenty years for a variety of advertisers which featured human models, nearly
all of whom were white.40 The court, in affirming the dismissal for failure to
state a claim granted by the district court,41 concluded that, "the single
and Asians constituted a dispreference of Hispanics. Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517,
528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
34 For example, the inclusion of Christian symbols and slogans in advertisements was
held to create an issue of fact as to whether the ordinary reader would understand the
advertisements as indicating a religious preference. The symbols challenged were not ones
of dispreference of a religion, but rather were challenged as indicating a preference for a
religion. Commonwealth v. Lotz Realty Co., 376 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Va. 1989) (applying
Virginia Fair Housing Law Code § 36-88(3) which parallels § 3604(c) of the Fair Housing
Act).
35 Soules v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir.
1992).
3 6 judge Keith, dissenting from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Housing Oppotunities
Made Equal, Inc., asserts that the race of the models in advertisements is not a product of
chance and that the race of the models indicates to black readers whether or not the
advertiser considers them desirable clients. Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 662 (6th Cir. 1991) (Keith, J., dissenting).
37 Section 3604(c) applies to the use of models of a particular race as the mode for
expressing a racial preference. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991).
3 8 Saunders v. General Serv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1058 (E.D. Va. 1987).
39 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991).
40Id. at649.
41 Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 731 F. Supp.
801, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991).
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publication of an advertisement which uses a small number of all-white models
does not, without more, state a cognizable claim under section 3604(c) as a
matter of law." 42 Because the court applied the ordinary reader test,43 the
court's conclusion is that the ordinary reader would not view the use of a small
number of all-white models in a single advertisement as indicating a racial
preference.
In seeming conflict with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Housing
Opportunities Made Equal, Inc.44 is the decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Ragin v. New York Tmes Co.45 The Ragin
court held that a newspaper could be held liable46 under section 3604(c) for
publishing, over a period of time, housing advertisements which featured
virtually all-white human models. 47 The court affirmed the district court's
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. 48 The practical impact of the Second
Circuit's decision is to allow the trial court to apply the ordinary reader
standard to the challenged advertisements. The court went on, however, to say
that as a matter of law an advertisement which uses one or two models of one
race and which is displayed two or three times would not indicate a racial
42 Housing Opportuniies Made Equal, Inc., 943 F.2d at 648. The court also held that
§ 3604(c) did not create liability for a newspaper for publishing a series of otherwise
nondiscriminatory advertisements (on behalf of separate advertisers) which in the aggregate
send a discriminatory message. i at 650. Furthermore, the court said that construing
§ 3604(c) as imposing such liability would "faill] to pass constitutional muster based on an
analysis of relevant first amendment principles." Id. at 651.
43 Id. at 646.
44 The Housing Opportwnities majority reconciles its decision with the Ragin decision.
Id. at 648 n.3; see also infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. Judge Keith's dissent in
Houming Opportunities attempts to characterize the Housing Opportunities decision as
inconsistent with the decision reached in Ragin. Id. at 658 (Keith, J., dissenting).
45 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991).
46 The court assumes, as is made clear in its treatment of the constitutionality of
holding a newspaper liable for a § 3604(c) violation, that newspaper liability depends on the
liability of individual advertisers. See Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1001-04. Furthermore, the court
states, "[the newspaper's] liability may not be based on an aggregation of advertisements by
different advertisers .... IThe statute provides a prohibition only with regard to individual
advertisers." ld. at 1001-02. Thus, newspapers (and other media) can only be held liable for
publishing advertisements which are in themselves discriminatory.
47 The complaint alleged that nearly all the human models portrayed were white and
that when Blacks were portrayed, the depiction was only in advertisements for housing
occupied predominately by Blacks. ld. at 998.
48 Ragin v. New York Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aft'd, 923
F.2d 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991).
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preference to the ordinary reader and thus would not violate section 3604(c). 49
According to the court, section 3604(c) liability would most likely exist for
advertisers who "use a large number of models and/or advertise repetitively." 50
Thus, while the Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. and Ragin courts
disposed of the cases differently, they applied the same principle.51 Both courts
established that the use of all-white models only sends a discriminatory
message to the ordinary reader when the particular advertisement features a
large number of models or when numerous advertisements placed by an
advertiser with a particular publisher fail to include non-white models.52 The
necessary corollary of the established rule of law, that the ordinary reader
could not interpret an isolated advertisement featuring a small number of all-
white models or a single white model as indicating a racial preference, is the
source of debate regarding the propriety of the rule.
The requirement of proof of long-term failure to use non-white models or
of the use of a large number of all-white models in order to establish the
allegation that the use of models indicates a racial preference is often criticized.
Critics say the approach ignores the true impact of the race of models in
advertisements53 and disserves the remedial goal of the FHA.5 4 According to
Judge Keith's dissent in Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc., the
requirement of the use of a large number of models or of an established trend
of advertisements with all-white models has several flaws. First, Judge Keith
argues that while the ordinary white reader may not understand an
advertisement with one white model as indicating a preference for Whites, the
49 The court apparently assumes, or leaves it for the trial court to determine, in
establishing this standard, that the instant case is not of this variety. Ragin, 923 F.2d at
1002.
50 IcL Courts recognize that the use of all-white models for an extended period could
lead the reasonable reader to interpret the advertisements as indicating a racial preference.
See, e.g., Fenwick-Schafer v. Sterling Homes Corp., 774 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1991). In
Fenwick-Schafer, the defendant, over a 25-month period, had featured 132 models in
advertisements, all of whom were white. Id. at 363. The trial court rejected defendant's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 366.
51 The difference in outcome is explained by the fact that the Housing Opponunities
court dealt with a complaint which did not allege repeated publication of all-white
advertisements or the use of a large number of models by particular advertisers. Housing
Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 649 (6th Cir.
1991). However, the Ragin court refused to assume that no such scenario had been alleged
by the plaintiff's complaint and chose to allow the trial court to determine whether such
facts could be proven. Rag/n, 923 F.2d at 1002.
52 Housing Opportunides Made Equal, Inc., 943 F.2d at 648.




ordinary black reader very well may.55 Second, Judge Keith reiterates the
argument made in Saunders v. General Services Corp.56 that "human models in
advertising attempt to create an identification between the model, the consumer,
and the product." 57 Thus, requiring plaintiff to allege that a large number of
all-white models is pictured ignores the reality that an advertisement with one
white model may indeed send the message that Blacks are not welcome.
Finally, Judge Keith argues that no authority supports requiring that the
plaintiff allege the depiction of a large number of all-white models. 58
The Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. majority's approach is
superior to that of the Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. dissent. First,
while the ordinary reader test does not inquire as to whether challenged
advertisements are understood by actual readers as indicating a preference,
anecdotal evidence supports the contention that a single advertisement with a
white model does not send an exclusionary message, while a series of
advertisements (or a single advertisement with a large number of models) with
all-white models may. In a recent section 3604(c) case in which the use of all-
white models was challenged, 59 testimony adduced by the plaintiff indicated
that plaintiff and others came to understand the message of a long-term
advertising campaign featuring all-white models to convey a dispreference for
non-whites. 60 This understanding developed only after the advertisements had
been run multiple times. 61 In entering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the
55 Id. For a discussion of whether the ordinary reader standard should consider the
race of the recipient, see infra Parts IV and V.
56 659 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1987).
5 7 Id. at 1058; Houing Opportumties Made Equal, Inc., 943 F.2d at 658 (Keith, J.,
dissenting).
5 8 Houing Opportuniies Made Equal, Inc., 943 F.2d at 659 (Keith, J., dissenting).
59 Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
af'd, 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993). Defendants promoted an up-scale apartment complex
which ran a series of 104 advertisements over a two-year period depicting human models,
all of whom were white. Id. at 1223.
60 One plaintiff testified:
The first time you see it, you don't make much of it, but as time goes on, the
repetitiveness of the advertisement begins to drum a message home to you .... [Tihe
message I got from that is that blacks and minorities were not very welcome in the





OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
court noted, "the ads cannot be read singly in determining their message
because each is informed by the cumulative message of the campaign of which
it was a part." 62 Thus, actual readers' perception of messages sent by
advertising is impacted, at least in some instances, by the long-term failure to
use non-white models or by the use of large numbers of all-white models in
individual advertisements. 63
Second, adoption of Judge Keith's position would create an environment in
which advertisers would be unable to use models in advertising. If the use of a
single model were viewed as sufficient to send the message to the ordinary
reader that customers of the same race as the model are preferred, advertisers
would be potentially liable under section 3604(c) for every advertisement with
a single model. If the advertiser chooses to feature a black model, all non-black
readers would be able to argue that the natural interpretation of the ordinary
reader is that the advertisement excludes them. Moreover, the ramifications of
Judge Keith's position might extend to create liability for an advertiser who
features a large number of models, each of a different race, but who fails to
include a model of a particular race.64 Requiring a plaintiff to allege nothing
more than the use of a single white model in a single advertisement would
likely make it economically unfeasible for real estate owners to use models in
advertising. Despite the relative lack of analysis in support of the requirement,
the Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. and Ragin65 standard requiring
proof of a large number of models or a pattern of failure to include non-white
models is the most workable standard because it best comports with the way in
which advertising impacts actual readers. 66
62 Id. at 1232. The fact that the plaintiffs inferred a discriminatory message from the
pattern of the advertising campaign was not dispositive. The court concluded that "[gliven
this pattern, an ordinary reader... would naturally infer from these ads.., that white
individuals were preferred as tenants... ." Id. (emphasis added).
63 See, e.g., Ragin v. Steiner, Clateman and Assocs., 714 F. Supp. 709, 713
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs who alleged that defendant had depicted exclusively
white models in 27 separate advertisements had stated a claim under § 3604(c)).
6 4 The regulations promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to assist in applying § 3604(c) make clear that § 3604(c) does not require such
a literal display of each minority group. 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b) (1992).
65 Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 81 (1991).
6 6 See Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F. Supp. 1213, 1223
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), afftd, 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993).
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IV. THE RACE OF THE ORDINARY READER
Discussion of the race of the ordinary reader is conspicuously absent from
most cases applying the ordinary reader standard to alleged instances of subtle
exclusionary advertising, particularly all-white models cases. This Part of this
Comment summarizes court treatment of the issue of the race of the ordinary
reader. Discussion in Part V will turn to the question of whether the race of the
plaintiff ought to be considered in analyzing the challenged advertisement from
the ordinary reader's perspective.
In United States v. Hunter,67 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit created the ordinary reader standard to be applied in cases in
which section 3604(c) violations are alleged. The Hunter court applied, without
elaboration, the standard it created. 68 The Hunter court, in creating the
ordinary reader standard, did not refer to the ordinary reader of the excluded
race.69 At least facially, the case, which was the genesis of the ordinary reader
standard, did not contemplate viewing advertisements challenged under section
3604(c) from the perspective of, for example, the "ordinary black reader."70
Courts considering section 3604(c) challenges subsequent to Hunter,
especially those alleging the discriminatory use of human models, have not
been absolutely clear as to whether the hypothetical ordinary reader is thought
to be of the race of the litigant challenging the advertisement or not. However,
most courts do not consider the race of the litigants when applying the ordinary
reader standard.71 At least one court has explicitly rejected the argument that
67 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cen. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
68 Ld. at 215. For a discussion of the facts and the rule created in Hunter, see supra
notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
69 In Hunter, the advertisement excluded non-white people. Id. at 209.
70 The vast majority, if not all, of the reported § 3604(c) cases challenging the
allegedly discriminatory use of human models involve a black plaintiff or plaintiffs
challenging the use of all-white models in advertisements. Thus, this discussion will
consider the propriety of viewing challenged advertisements from the perspective of the
ordinary black reader. The arguments made here would apply equally to a case in which a
white plaintiff who alleged the communication of a preference for non-whites urged the
court to view the advertisement from the perspective of the ordinary white reader.
71 See, e.g., Soules v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817,
824 (2d Cir. 1992); Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc.,
943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991); Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F.
Supp. 1213, 1229-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), af'd, 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993). These cases are
examples of many which simply reiterate without elaboration the ordinary reader standard
stated in Hunter.
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challenged advertisements ought to "be evaluated through the eyes of the
'ordinary black readerO]' 
..... 
72
Ragin73 may be an exception to the standard approach of simply applying
the ordinary reader standard without reference to the ordinary reader's race.
The Ragin court defines the word "preference" in section 3604(c) as describing
"any ad that would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race from
answering it."74 Because the court made this statement-after stating that it
would apply the ordinary reader standard75-in the context of defining the term
"preference," whether the Ragin court considered the challenged advertisement
from the point of view of the ordinary black reader is unclear. 76 In his dissent
in Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. Judge Keith interprets the Ragin
decision as applying the ordinary black reader standard. 77 Judge Keith criticizes
the Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. majority for refusing to consider
the race of the ordinary reader and heartily endorses the approach taken, in his
view, by the Ragin court.78 Judge Keith says, in paraphrasing Ragin, "[t]he
relevant question is whether a member of an excluded race would feel
excluded. The test is not whether a member of the included race would feel
excluded."79
While one court arguably considers challenged advertisements from the
perspective of the ordinary black reader, most courts do not consider the
hypothetical ordinary reader's race in analyzing advertisements under section
3604(c). Courts should consider the race of the litigants in applying the
ordinary reader standard.
72 Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F. Supp. at 1227 n.7.
73 Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81
(1991).
74 Id at 999-1000 (emphasis added).
75 In its discussion of the ordinary reader standard, the court did not differentiate
between the ordinary white and the ordinary black reader. Id. at 999.
76 The alternative interpretation is that the court considered whether the ordinary race-
neutral reader would construe the challenged advertisement as indicating a racial preference
to the ordinary black reader.
77 Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d
644, 658 (6th Cir. 1991) (Keith, J., dissenting).
78 Id.
79 Id (citing Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991)).
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V. THE ORDINARY BLACK READER STANDARD
We are each a product of a culture that shapes the interpretations of the
stimuli we encounter. No one views events in complete isolation.80 Rather, our
perceptions are influenced by experience,81 culture,82 and learned meanings.
83
Because people with different perspectives may react differently to the same
stimulus, courts applying the ordinary reader standard without considering the
race of the actual recipient of the allegedly discriminatory message disserve the
goal of section 3604(c).
One scholar's argument that our judicial system fails to consider issues
from the perspective of the litigants84 has generated substantial commentary.
According to this scholar, we define ourselves by our social group
membership.85 Members of minority groups have a stronger tendency to define
themselves by their group membership. 86 One's group membership (especially
minority group membership), in turn, profoundly impacts the way in which one
perceives stimuli.87 This scholar's argument concludes that unjust results are
achieved in our justice system because judges fail to consider the group
membership and the resulting preconceptions of the litigants. 88
80 AJ. AYER, PHLOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 157 (1982).
81 Id.
82 Many argue that differing group histories are a central part of the factual situation in
all legal arrangements and, as such, should be considered in deciding disputes. E.g., Aviam
Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups and the Anglo-Ameican
Tradition, 48 WAsH. & LEEL. Rnv. 381, 415, 418 (1991).83 See, e.g., Christopher Steskal, Note, Creating Space for Racial Difference: The
Case for Af'ican-Ameican Schools, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187, 191 (1992).
84 MARTHA MINOW, MAKiNG ALL THE DIFFERENCE 65 (1990); Martha Minow,
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 15 (1987).
85 MARTHAMINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFMERENCE 355 (1990).
86 Id.
87 Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Blank, an
employment discrimination case, defendants moved to have the judge recused from the case
on the basis that she was black and had, in her career as an attorney, represented
employment discrimination plaintiffs. The judge refused to recuse herself, arguing that,
were defendant's position to be accepted, no judge would be able to hear a case since
everyone, including judges, has characteristics and has had experiences which influence
how one views different issues.
88 MINow, supra note 85, at 62; see also Kim M. Watterson, Note, The Power of
Words: The Power of Advocacy Challenging the Power of Hate Speech, 52 U. Prrr. L.
Ray. 955, 966 (1991) (arguing that lawyers often incorrectly assume that the perspectives of
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Much study has centered on how American black culture affects the way in
which American Blacks perceive their environment and react to occurrences.
Researchers commonly conclude that differences between black American
culture and white American culture create major differences in the way Blacks
and Whites react to identical stimuli. 89
Specifically, much research has centered on the reaction of Whites (non-
target group members) and Blacks (target group members)90 to racist, so-called
"hate speech." 91 This research generally establishes the fairly obvious
proposition that anti-discrimination law can take either the perspective of the
alleged perpetrator or of the alleged victim.92 Studies comparing Black and
White reaction to hate speech indicate that the perspective from which one
views incidents makes a difference in the way in which individuals react to
such incidents. In general, while the vast majority of Whites are disgusted by
racist speech, incidents of hate speech are viewed by Whites as being less
serious than are the same incidents in the view of Blacks. 93
Blacks and Whites, by virtue of cultural differences, also react differently94
to a more subtle racist gesture, the displaying of the Confederate flag.95 Whites
those being judged are irrelevant or have already been taken into account through the
perspective of the judge).
89 See, e.g., Steskal, supra note 83, at 191; see also MINOW, supra note 85, at 26
(reporting that some contend that the use of a different dialect, "Black English," accounts
for poor language performance by black children).
90 The author of this Comment by no means intends to imply that Whites are never
hate speech targets. However, this discussion treats Blacks as target group members and
Whites as non-target group members because most published research deals with Blacks
who have been targeted by hate speech and considers how their reaction is influenced by
their cultural background.
91 The analogy between reaction to hate speech and reaction to advertising featuring
all-white models is not a flawless one. While the ordinary reader standard focuses on how
one would perceive a given advertisement, cultural differences regarding hate speech seem
to be in reaction to the speech. That is, most people perceive hate speech as offensive, but
may react to it differently.
92 Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilema of Liberal Refor, 90 YALE L.J.
1880 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND ANERICAN LAW (2d ed.
1980)) (arguing that anti-discrimination law has incorrectly adopted the viewpoint of the
perpetrator).
93 Watterson, supra note 88, at 965; see also Mad 1. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech. Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2326 (1989).
94 E.g., Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L.
REV. 295, 311-12 (1990).
95 Several states fly the Confederate flag or flags that incorporate the Confederate flag.
Further, many schools, including the University of Mississippi, unofficially use the flag as a
school symbol. Ronald J. Rychlak, Cvil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political
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opposed to the Confederate flag ignore the flag; others feel that the flag merely
expresses pride in "southern heritage." Blacks tend to have a more emotional
reaction to the flying of the flag and cannot disassociate the message of racial
isolation conveyed by the flag.96
In addition to differences in reaction to racist speech, research of
advertising indicates that Blacks and Whites react differently to advertisements
depending on the race of the actors in the advertisement. One study indicates
that, despite the fact that black and Hispanic actors are typically cast in smaller,
less-important roles, Blacks and Hispanics viewing television commercials
perceive black and Hispanic actors as playing the more important roles in the
advertisements. 97 Furthermore, Blacks more easily identify with and perceive
themselves as more similar to black commercial actors than to white
commercial actors.98 Black viewers thus respond more favorably to products
promoted by black actors. 99 Finally, in a study in which black actors were
used, it was found that "whites were less likely to purchase the products and
had less favorable attitudes toward the products and the advertisements when
the advertisements featured black rather than white actors," thus indicating that
race-group identification functions to alter the perception of Whites as well as
Blacks. 1°° Advertisers compose advertisements with the understanding that
members of different races generally react differently to advertisements
depending on the race of the actors in advertisements. The fact that Blacks are
absent from the overwhelming majority of advertisements and that black actors
are heavily utilized by advertisers who target black consumers displays that
advertisers realize (or assume) that the race of advertisement actors impacts the
reception of the product or service being advertised.
First, mainstream media advertisers generally avoid using black models. A
survey by the New York City Consumer Affairs Commissioner found that in a
sample of 2,108 magazine advertisements only 5.2% of the models were
Correctness: Free Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1411, 1416
(1992).
96 Id.
97 Robert E. Wilkes & Humberto Valencia, Hispanics and Blacks in Television
Commercials, 18 J. OFADvERTiSING 19, 25 (1989).
9 8 Tommy E. Whittier & Joan DiMeo, Viewers' Reactions to Racial Cues in
Advertising Stimuli, I. OFADvERTISiNGRES., Dec. 1991, at 37, 38.
9 9 Tommy E. Whittier, The Effects of Actors' Race in Conunercial Advertising: Review
and Extension, 20J. OF ADVERTISIN 54, 59 (1991).1(0 Whittier & DiMeo, supra note 98, at 43.
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black.10 Another study reports that less than 3% of print advertisements
include black actors.10 2 Black actors appear more frequently in television
advertisements. One study indicates that, while Blacks comprised only 5% of
the actors appearing in prime-time television commercials in 1964, in a 1984
sample of 904 prime-time television commercials, 26% of the models were
black.103 Still, when black models are utilized, they are typically cast in roles
of little importance or as a member of a large group of people. 104 While
progress is being made, Blacks are still underrepresented in mainstream media
advertising.
At the same time, when advertisers seek to attract black consumers, they
employ black models and advertising agencies which are experienced in
targeting a black audience.' 0 5 The incidence of advertisements with black
models is highest in black-oriented media, such as Ebony magazine and the
Black Entertainment Television network. 10 6 Furthermore, black community
leaders are displeased by the fact that destructive products like tobacco and
alcohol are often targeted to black consumers through the use of advertising
tactics (including the use of black models) designed to appeal to Blacks.' 0 7
Thus, advertisers, both those attempting to target a white audience and those
attempting to target a black audience, choose models of certain races in
101 Janet Braunstein, A Warped Mirror on African Americans; Survey Targets What's
Wrong With Too Many of the Images Seen on Television, Print, DETROIr FREE PRESS, Aug.
24, 1992, at 4F.
102 Wilkes & Valencia, supra note 97, at 20.
103 Id. at 20, 23.
104 Id. at 24-25.
105 Braunstein, supra note 101; see also Janice C. Simpson, Buying Black; Mainstream
Companies are Cashing in on African-Ameican Conswners, TIME, Aug. 31, 1992, at 52.
106 Janet Braunstein, Marketing Diversity; Ads Designed for Minority Consumers Offer
Positive Images but Fail to Reach the Mainstream, DETRorr FREE PRESS, Oct. 19, 1992, at
13F.
107 Black community leaders criticized the marketing of St. Ides malt liquor, claiming
that the advertising was intended to lure black teenagers. Malt Liquors Continue to Draw
iticini,. Offensive Advertising by Manufacturers, MODERN BREWERY AGE, May 18, 1992,
at 2. After a ground swell of opposition to the advertisements, which featured a black rap
star, the manufacturer withdrew the advertisement. W. John Moore, An Industry on the
Rocks, 24 NAT'LJ. 8 (1992).
Additionally, studies of billboards indicate that a higher proportion of the billboards in
black neighborhoods advertise tobacco (and alcohol) than is true for billboards in general.
Richard W. Pollay et al., Separate, but Not Equal: Racial Segmentation in Cigarette
Advertising, I. oF ADVERTISING 45, 47 (1992). Ethnic neighborhoods are clearly targeted
for tobacco and alcohol billboards. Naresh K. Malhotra, Health Care Marketing Abstracts,
J. OF HEALTH CARE MARKETING, Sept. 1992, at 84.
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complete understanding of the fact that the race of the models impacts the
recipient's reaction to the advertisement.
In light of the fact that recipients react more or less favorably to
advertisements depending on the race of the actors, it is not surprising that
black models are absent from some advertisements and present in others.
Advertisers, in choosing actors for advertisements, can be expected to choose
actors who will maximize the number of consumers who will be positively
impacted by the advertisement. The failure to cast black models is likely not the
result of personal bias on the part of advertisers, but rather a rational reaction
to the fact that some Whites react adversely to advertisements with black
models.10 8
In this vein, a divisive issue is whether we should forbid advertisers to
make such business decisions. 109 For example, assume that an advertiser with a
limited marketing budget has the choice of casting two white models or one
white and one black model. He also knows that using a black model will gain
ten black customers, but will lose twenty white customers. We must face the
issue of whether we should dictate the advertiser's decision in such
circumstances. While we generally allow advertisers to decide how to compose
advertisements on a purely profit-oriented basis, in the realm of housing
advertising, we have decided that the goal of desegregated housing outweighs
the right of advertisers to make profit-maximizing decisions. The wisdom of
this policy should not be uncritically accepted.
Comparing Blacks' and Whites' reaction to blatant and subtle racist
gestures and to racial cues in advertising indicates that Blacks and Whites, by
virtue of cultural differences, do not view potentially discriminatory gestures in
the same way. These findings militate in favor of considering the race of the
litigants when applying the ordinary reader standard. Because, according to the
research summarized above, the ordinary black reader is more likely to notice
and be offended by a racist statement aimed at Blacks than is the ordinary white
reader, and is likely to identify more favorably with black than white actors in
advertisements, the ordinary reader standard should take into account the race,
and hence, the perception, of the litigants. For instance, if a black plaintiff
alleges that an advertisement violates section 3604(c), the advertisement should
be reviewed to determine if the ordinary black reader would naturally infer that
108 Whittier & DiMeo, supra note 98, at 44.
109 The issue of whether § 3604(c) infringes on First Amendment free speech rights,
an issue beyond the scope of this Comment, should also be considered. For a discussion of
the First Amendment issues, see Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 651-53 (6th Cir. 1991).
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the advertisement indicates a racial preference. °10 Just as a White might react
differently than would a Black to subtle racist speech, a Black might discern a
subtle statement of racial preference that a White would not notice.11' As Judge
Keith's dissent in Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. argues, opposition
to the consideration of race in applying the ordinary reader standard arises from
the "inability to see that people in the minority, when excluded, are likely to
feel that others are preferred.""12 An approach which views the advertisement
from the perspective of the ordinary reader of the allegedly excluded race is
better tailored to achieve the goal of the FHA-integrated housing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of truly integrated housing embodied in the FHA is not being
achieved. The race of the human models in housing advertisements has a great
impact on who inquires about and ultimately obtains advertised housing. Thus,
if we are truly devoted to the ideal of integrated housing, we should act to end
the subtle, but effective, discriminatory use of models in real estate
advertisements.
The ordinary reader standard, the standard by which courts review
challenged advertisements, should be refined so as to give courts applying the
standard more guidance and so as to inform advertisers what practices, with
respect to human models, would be interpreted by the ordinary reader as
indicating a racial preference. Additionally, because differences in perspectives
cause differences in the perceptions of Blacks and Whites, the ordinary reader
standard should be altered. Advertisements should be evaluated from the
perspective of the ordinary reader of the race of the individual challenging the
advertisement. Most commonly, this would require assessing the advertisement
from the viewpoint of the ordinary black reader. These changes would go far to
stop discriminatory housing advertising through the use of all-white models,
thus expediting the achievement of the goal of integrated housing.
Ivan C. Smith
110 This approach is the one urged by Judge Keith in his Housing Opponrunities
dissent. Ild. at 658 (Keith, I., dissenting).
111 See, e.g., Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F. Supp. 1213, 1224
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff's testimony indicated that his
understanding of the challenged advertisements as indicating a preference for Whites
partially grew out of his knowledge of historical patterns of discriminatory housing
practices; plaintiff testified, "I didn't just wake up in the morning without these
advertisements being in some context." Id.
112 Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc., 943 F.2d at 659 (Keith, J., dissenting).
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